SCIENTIFIC REALISM 3)
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In his review of Ch. LANDESMAN's "Introduction to Epistemology", J.van GIGCH writes:
"Scientific realism is a claim about the aims of scientific inquiry. It is a form or realism and rejects the various forms of idealism and constructivism which say that the world we are trying to gain knowledge of, does not have an independent and objective existence. It also rejects the skepticism which claims that this aim is unrealizable. According to LANDESMAN, "scientific activity is a self-correcting activity that is progressive: it gradually provides betterand better accounts of the way the world is, and eliminates theories that are epistemically defective"(1999, p. 90)
In fact, these views are very similar to POPPER's.
LANDESMAN adds: "If the success of applied science is no accident, that it is plausible to suppose that our theories capture at least some aspects of reality to some extent"(Ibid)
Of course, even the philosopher most skeptical about reality will not skip his dinner because he cannot be sure it is "real".
Categories
- 1) General information
- 2) Methodology or model
- 3) Epistemology, ontology and semantics
- 4) Human sciences
- 5) Discipline oriented
Publisher
Bertalanffy Center for the Study of Systems Science(2020).
To cite this page, please use the following information:
Bertalanffy Center for the Study of Systems Science (2020). Title of the entry. In Charles François (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics (2). Retrieved from www.systemspedia.org/[full/url]
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